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Chief Information Officers (CIOs) around 
the globe are being drawn into the 
implementation of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) 
compliance.  According to the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) (www.pcaob-us.org) 1, 15,000 US 
companies, 1,200 non-US based companies 
and 1,423 accounting firms spread across 76 
countries are affected by SOX.  In particular, 
Section 404 (404), which deals with 
management’s assessment of internal 
controls, affects CIOs and information 
technology (IT) departments (Berghel 2005).  
With the widespread 
use of technology, 
internal controls are 
either fully automated 
by being embedded 
within information 
systems, or combine 
automated and manual 
controls.  404 therefore 
corrals a wide range of 
applications such as 
product accounting, 






budgeting and other 
operational, tracking 
and reporting systems.  These include not 
only the organization’s main systems, such as 
ERP systems, but also local databases and 
personal spreadsheets developed and used on 
an ad hoc basis.  Consequently, compliance 
and regulatory issues are something that CIOs 
need to understand, address and certainly not 
neglect (see inset box). 
 
404 requires CIOs to work closely with 
CFOs, CEOs and Auditors.  Auditors have to 
attest and report on management’s assessment 
of the internal controls. This attestation is 
required to be in accordance with standards 
for attestation engagements issued by the 
PCAOB.  At the very least, financial reporting 
processes have to be mapped and tested.  This 
has to be done to a level that ensures 
consistent and accurate financial reports are 
provided to shareholders and potential 
investors.  This requires some of the business 
analysis skills that many IS departments 
already have.  However, it also requires audit 
and control skills typically found in finance 
departments.  Thus, achieving 404 
compliance requires 
CIOs to understand the 
nature of the 
relationships they have 
with the CFO, CEO and 
auditors and the tactics 
they can use, when 
working with these 







the senior-most officers 
in an organization are 
not neutral (Donovan 
1988).  Such 
relationships are 
characterised by a number of dimensions: 
authority, centralization, decision rights, 
participation in decision making, and politics.  
(Jasperson et al. 2002) refer to these 
dimensions as power.  Power has to do with 
relationships between two or more actors in 
which the behaviors of one is affected by the 
behaviors of the other (Hall 1999). We use 
power relationships as the basis for our 
analysis because previous empirical research 
shows that CIOs have relatively little power 
in organizations (Lucas 1984).  
 
SOX and 404 focus the mind 
Reports suggest that the costs of 
implementing 404 on for the average large 
US company is US$ 5.1 million in the first 
year and then a further US$ 3.7 million on 
an on-going basis (Maitland 2004).  This 
cost appears to be very large considering 
that dollars spent deliver little tangible value 
to customers or, arguably, shareholders.  
However, Chief Executive and Chief 
Financial Officers face severe penalties - 
from US$1,000,000 or up to 10 years 
imprisonment to US$5,000,000 or up to 20 
years imprisonment – if convicted of 
accounting and reporting violations.  When 
compared with such potential penalties, the 




We adapted Jasperson et al’s power 
relationships taxonomy to differentiate 
between power and influence.  Individuals 
exercising power impose their will or interests 
by use of force; whereas, influence occurs 
when an individual (A), in a relationship, 
frames others’ choices in terms of outcomes 
or interests they (A) expect to achieve; 
however, the individual (in this instance A) 
cannot impose these outcomes and interests 
by force (Castells 1998).  Power and 
influence can be used by individuals to ‘Push’ 
their outcomes and interests or to encourage 
and convince others to ‘Pull’ their outcomes 
and interests.  In order to gain deeper insights 
into relationships, we created the FRIN 
framework (see Figure 1) which has two 
power relationships – Formal and Radical – 
and two influence relationships – Interpretive 
and Negotiated.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Formal power relationships are based on 
the structural positions that individuals have 
in the organization hierarchy.  Typically, 
individuals in these power relationships 
assume that there is a single, most appropriate 
set of goals to be achieved and that people 
strive towards these goals.  Individuals that 
take actions to reach other goals or objectives 
are considered irrational.  Such actions are 
assumed to be taken because people have 
incomplete information, and consequently, 
the focus turns to giving people more 
information and education.  These power 
relationships are used to stimulate ‘demand’ 
for the interests and outcomes of those 
exercising power.   
 
Radical power relationships are based on 
achieving objectives and goals that impact the 
wider institutional context. Power is assumed 
to exist separately to the organizational 
context and yet, affects the actions of 
individuals within the organization. Radical 
power relationships are aimed at contributing 
to the overthrow of wider societal and 
organizational structures.  This power 
relationship is characterised by individuals 
using sheer force to impose their will.  These 
power relationships are used to ‘push’ the 
outcomes and interests of those individuals 
who use this power. 
 
Negotiated influence relationships are 
based on individuals’ abilities to affect the 
behaviours of others who have different or 
potentially conflicting interests or who seek 
different outcomes.  Individuals use dialogue 
and political processes, such as negotiation 
and compromise, to reconcile divergent 
interests and to bring others around to pursue 
their direction.  This relationship assumes 
power to be an objective reality, which often 
takes the form of resources or control over 
resources.  Individuals using this influence 
relationship use resources to ‘push’ their 
interests and the outcomes they want to see 
happen.   
 
Interpretive influence relationships are 
based on individuals’ controlling and 
constructing the shared assumptions and 
interpretations that prevail across the 
organization.  Individuals influence others by 
controlling meaning and shaping perceptions 
through the use of symbolic activities, stories 
and metaphors, the introduction and use of 
language and rituals and new procedures.  
Outcomes and interests, in this type of 
relationship, are achieved by manipulating the 
organization’s subjective reality instead of 
formal, hierarchical authority or control over 
resources.  Individuals use Interpretive 
relationships to create ‘demand’ for the 
outcomes and interests they hold. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1   The FRIN Framework. 
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The FRIN Framework combines the ideas 
of power and influence with pull and push, 
thereby providing a lens through which to 
understand relationships between key players, 
the Chief Executive, CFO, CIO and Auditors, 
involved in 404 implementation. We 
conducted case study research of these 
relationships in six organizations.  We used a 
survey instrument as the means of collecting 
data, so that we could compare data across the 
organizations. As relationships are bi-
directional we asked respondents to describe 
the relationship from both directions.  Given 
the sensitive nature of both SOX compliance 
and ability to identify specific individuals 
from each organization, we use the names of 
States / Provinces, based on each 
organization’s home country of incorporation, 
as pseudonyms for the organization name. 
 
INSIGHTS INTO CIO RELATIONSHIPS 
Alabama – this organization is the UK 
subsidiary of a Fortune 250 US-based home 
building company whose shares are traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
Alabama’s CIO has an Interpretive 
relationship in the direction of the CFO 
whereas the relationships is Negotiated in the 
opposite direction. They both use influence to 
change and adapt each others’ behaviors to 
achieve 404 outcomes.  The CFO’s influence 
is directed at pushing 404 requirements on to 
the IT department; whereas the CIO seeks to 
create the environment for the Finance 
Department to understand IT.  There is a pull-
push dynamic which indicates that this pair 
has different outcomes in mind and that they 
using different influence mechanisms to 
pursue their respective outcomes.  Alabama’s 
CIO has no direct relationship with the CEO, 
which can be of concern especially where the 
CIO has a significant role to play in the 
implementation of 404.  It implies, as well, 
that the CIO has access to the CEO via the 
CFO which gives the CFO a political edge 
over the CIO.  The relationship between the 
CIO and the Auditor is based on a Negotiated 
relationship, which suggests that the CIO is 
getting the Auditor to accept the controls and 
activities that they have in place. The Auditor, 
on the other hand, is using force to push 
specific 404 requirements in the direction of 
Alabama’s CIO.  She/he is in a weaker 
position in terms of the CFO and Auditors, 
both of whom are likely to have direct and 
strong relationships with the CEO (see Figure 
2 I). 
 
Tuscany – this organization is a wholly 
owned UK subsidiary of one of the world’s 
largest manufacturers and distributors of 
premium eyewear, incorporated in Italy with a 
21 per cent stock listing on the New York 
Stock Exchange. 
  
The CIO has a Negotiated relationship 
with the CFO which suggests that influence is 
being used to push the IT aspects of 404 
towards the finance department.  This is a 
symmetrical relationship as the CFO has a 
Negotiated relationship in the direction of the 
CIO. This has the potential for conflict as 
both the CIO and the CFO will tend to push 
their own interests and outcomes; neither 
seems to want to create conditions for 
encouraging demand for their 404 outcomes – 
this would require one or the other to adopt an 
Interpretive relationship.  Instead, the CIO 
appears to have an Interpretive relationship 
with the CEO.  This suggests that the CIO is 
providing the CEO with information that 
affects the underpinning assumptions in the 
organization.  The Auditors have a Radical 
relationship with the CIO suggesting that they 
are able to regulate the activities of the 
functions and activities of the IT department.  
Section 404 gives Auditors significant powers 
in terms of checking the adequacy of internal 
systems controls (see Figure 2). 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Surrey – this organization is a leading 
supply-chain management company for the 
home entertainment industry. It is wholly 
owned by a UK gaming and entertainment 
company whose stocks are quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. 
 
The CIO had different relationships with 
the CFO and CEO but is faced with the same 
relationship from both these players.  In 
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relation to the CFO the CIO has a Negotiated 
relationship which suggests that Surrey’s CIO 
uses resources such as knowledge of systems, 
IT personnel and budgets to ensure IT’s 
outcomes are achieved.  The CFO has a 
Formal relationship with the CIO, indicating 
that the CFO uses force where necessary to 
create demand for the outcomes sought by the 
Finance Department.  The CEO has a Formal 
relationship with the CIO suggesting that 
power is used push the outcomes that the 
CEO wants.  This suggests that Surrey’s CIO 
is in a vulnerable position as power can be 
exercised in their direction but they can only 
use influence to achieve their outcomes.  This 
position is exacerbated with the Auditors that 
are using influence to push the outcomes they 
want from the CIO (see Figure 2). 
 
Alsace – is a waste management division 
of a global environmental services company, 
incorporated in France with stock listings in 
Paris and New York. 
 
We see the same pattern of relationship 
between the CIO and CFO as Tuscany above.  
Both have Negotiated relationships.  The 
CEO too has a Negotiated relationship with 
the CIO and vice versa. This suggests that 
these players are engaged in influencing one 
another to take on their outcomes. This can 
lead to potential conflict between the players 
where the outcomes are significantly 
different.  Where these differences persist the 
CEO might well have to use Formal or even 
Radial power to bring about a unified 
direction.  The CIO has a symmetrical 
Interpretive relationship with the Auditors. 
This shows that both are trying to influence 
each other into wanting to adopt their 
outcomes, which can be positive where these 
are the aligned (see Figure 2). 
 
Texas – this organization is a UK 
subsidiary of a global leader in secure 
electronic payment technologies. The parent 
company, incorporated in the US, has a New 
York Stock Exchange listing.   The CIO has 
an Interpretive relationship with the CFO; 
whereas the CFO has a Negotiated 
relationship with the CFO.  This pattern is the 
same as Alabama above. Both use influence 
to achieve there outcomes. The CFO has a 
symmetrical Formal relationship with the 
CEO; whilst the CIO has no direct 
relationship with the CEO. This suggests that 
the CIO relies on the CFO to influence the 
CEO.  The Auditors have no direct 
relationship with the CIO. Instead they have a 
direct relationship with the CFO, which again 
suggests that the CIO has to go through the 
CFO in order to achieve IT-related outcomes 
(see Figure 2). 
 
Ontario – this organization is the UK 
division of a Canadian financial services 
company, listed on the Toronto and New 
York Stock Exchanges.  Ontario provides 
insurance and wealth management products 
and services. 
 
In this case we find relationships that are 
based only on the use of power. The 
relationship between the CIO and CFO is 
symmetrical and based on Formal power.  
This is the same for the relationship between 
the CEO and CFO.  The CIO has no direct 
relationship with the CEO.  Thus, it appears 
that each player is pushing for the outcomes 
that he / she wants to achieve using force to 
get their way.  The use influence to persuade 
colleagues is not apparent.  The CIO appears 
to be fairly isolated as the CFO is key to 
exercising any power or influence over the 
CEO.  The CFO – Auditor relationship is 
Radical which suggests that both sides are 
using force to push their outcomes on to the 
other.  This would lay the groundwork for an 
antagonistic relationship (see Figure 2). 
 
EXPLORING TACTICS CIOs USE TO 
ADDRESS RELATIONSHIPS 
We turn our attention to a discussion of the 
tactics CIOs use in each power relationship 
(King et al. 1994).  We studied the tactics 
CIOs use when implementing 404 using 
Institutional theory as the conceptual lens 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983;King et al. 
1994;Robey & Boudreau 1999).  There are 
six broad categories of tactics:   
 
1. Knowledge Building – creating a 
knowledge base necessary to develop an 
innovation and its use. 
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2. Knowledge Deployment – disseminating 
knowledge and developing an 
understanding of knowledge among 
people. 
3. Innovation Directive – actions that 
command an organisation to produce 
innovations and set out orders to use the 
innovation. 
4. Mobilization – actions taken to persuade 
decentralised players and subsidiaries to 
use an innovation. 
5. Standardization – agreements between 
organisational members that privilege 
and sustain certain course of action. 
6. Subsidies – funding implementers’ costs 
during innovation development and 
users’ costs during deployment and use.   
 
The tactics used vary depending on the type 
of relationship.  We found that CIOs in: 
 
• Formal power relationships use 
Subsidies, Standardization and 
Innovation Directives.  
• Radical power relationships deploy 
Knowledge Deployment, Subsidies, 
Standardization and Innovation 
Directives 
• Interpretive influence relationships use 
Knowledge Deployment, Subsidies and 
Mobilization 
• Negotiated influence relationships use 
Knowledge Building, Knowledge 
Deployment, Subsidies and Innovation 
Directive 
 
Where the same tactic is adopted in different 
relationships, the ways in which the tactic is 
deployed varies considerably.  Figure 3 
condenses our findings of the differences in 
the ways in which the tactics were used.  It 
shows that in Negotiated relationships 
knowledge deployment can be enacted by 
creating a central repository of knowledge, 
making SOX documents available 
electronically, holding seminars and 
workshop and establishing internal SOX 
forums.  Knowledge deployment, in 
Interpretive relationships, involves moving 
individuals between subsidiaries on 
secondment.  The secondments can span a 
few weeks to up to six months.  In another 
example, Radical relationships use innovation 
directive tactics to ‘name and shame’ 
subsidiaries and individuals who are not 
achieving SOX compliance or who fail to 
follow prescribed procedures and methods.  
The overall tone of communications is that of 
‘telling’ people what needs to be done.  The 
same tactic in Formal relationships is used 
encourage bottom-up implementation, 
involving people from different levels in the 
organization.  The tone of communications is 
‘selling’ the importance of complying with 
prescribed procedures and methods.  
Innovation directive tactics in Negotiated 
relationships take the form of guidelines and 
templates that people use and follow to ensure 
compliance.   
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
CIOs play an increasingly vital role in 
achieving 404 and other forms of compliance.  
CIOs need to have an insight into the type of 
relationships they have each of the key 
players that are involved with compliance 
implementation.  They have a range of tactics 
they can use to achieve the outcomes that they 
seek.  However, the relationships CIOs have 
with the other players means that they will be 
using a range of tactics to achieve the 
outcomes they seek.  These may or may not 
be in the best interests of the CIO and the IT 
department.  Where the outcomes are aligned, 
we anticipate that a compliance 
implementation will go smoothly.  However, 
where the outcomes are not aligned each 
player will use power and influence tactics 
based on the perceived type of relationships.  
CIOs need to understand how to use power-
based implementation levers.  These levers 
are directed at affecting behaviours through 
the use of sanctions and force.  Influence 
levers are based on tactics that change 
behaviour through education and social 
processes.  Our findings show that CIOs are 
often isolated from the CEO and Auditors, 
relying on the CFO for direction.  We suggest 
CIOs need to widen their base of relationships 
and develop new internal power and influence 
relationships when implementing 404 
compliance.  In fact, we argue that these 
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relationships will become essential 
capabilities for CIOs as they are likely to be 
brought into the executive management team 
and made accountable for the quality of the 
financial data processed by the information 
systems they manage; no CEO or CFO is 
going to take the fall alone because of bad 
data from the CIO. 
Finally, one consequence of the 
globalization of technology and processes, 
exemplified by off-shoring, is that compliance 
and governance are becoming a global 
phenomenon.  The FRIN framework has been 
developed in relation to implementation of 
SOX in organizations with parent companies 
in different countries.  Arguably, the 
framework can be applied to other types of 
compliance initiatives that involve the use of 
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1
 The PCAOB’s mission is to oversee the 
auditors of public companies in order to 
protect the interests of investors and further 
the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, fair, and independent audit 
reports. 
 
